Partially consonant belief functions (pcb), studied by P. Walley, are the only class of Dempster-Shafer belief functions that are consistent with the likelihood principle of statistics. Structurally, the set of foci of a pcb is partitioned into non-overlapping groups and within each group, foci are nested. The pcb class includes both probability function and Zadeh's possibility function as special cases. This paper studies decision making under uncertainty described by pcb. We prove a representation theorem for preference relation over pcb lotteries to satisfy an axiomatic system that is similar in spirit to von Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms of the linear utility theory. The closed-form expression of utility of a pcb lottery is a combination of linear utility for probabilistic lottery and two-component (binary) utility for possibilistic lottery. In our model, the uncertainty information, risk attitude and ambiguity attitude are treated separately. A tractable technique to extract ambiguity attitude from a decision maker behavior is also discussed.
Introduction
In recent years, Dempster-Shafer (DS) belief function theory [3, 21, 23, 28] has drawn an increasing interest in the artificial intelligence and statistics community. The main appeal of the DS theory is its ability to faithfully express a wider class of uncertainty such as the notion of ambiguity that is not expressible by standard probability. Another advantage of DS theory, as its proponents argue, is the close link to evidence, which is the objective source of uncertainty.
The statistical inference problem is an important background for belief function theory. Dempster [3] and Shafer [22] have demonstrated how belief function theory generalizes Bayesian statistical inference. This generalization allows prior knowledge as well as conditional models to be described by belief functions rather than by probability functions.
The inclusion of Bayesian inference as a special case also gives rise to an opportunity for checking the validity of belief function theory against a number of fundamental principles on which statistics is founded. Walley [26] studies two functionals Q and R that represent, in terms of commonality functions, observational and prior evidences, respectively. He finds (see Theorem 3) that in order to be consistent with Bayes rule, observations must be represented by special belief functions. In this class, the set of foci are partitioned. Within each partition, foci are nested. Such belief functions are called partially consonant or pcb for short. The partially consonant class is rich enough to include as special cases probability functions (each singleton is a partition) and Zadeh's possibility functions (there is only one element in the partition).
Initially, consonant belief functions were used by Shafer [21] to represent statistical evidence. Later, Shafer [22] renounces the idea on the grounds that the set of consonant belief functions is not closed under Dempster's rule of combination. This property is desirable because from a statistical point of view, a series of independent observations can be viewed as a single (compound) observation. So either Dempster's rule is not suitable for combination of independent evidences or the consonant form is not appropriate for representation of evidence. Shafer gives up the latter and keeps the former. However, Walley [26] , facing the same choices, comes to a different conclusion. Arguing that (1) the conditions by which Dempster's rule is consistent with Bayes' rule are too restrictive, and (2) Dempster's rule is not unique in satisfying a number of desirable properties for evidence combination, Walley concludes that Dempster's rule is neither suitable for combining independent observations nor for combining prior belief with observational evidence.
One still open problem is the use of belief functions for decision making. The main issue here is that a departure from probability also means the loss of Bayesian decision theory which ranks alternatives by their expected utilities (EU). A number of proposals for decision making with belief functions have been proposed in literature. One basic idea is to find a transformation that converts a given belief function into a probability function and then use the probability function for decision making [23] , [2] . von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) linear utility can be brought to use for belief functions, which could be viewed as lower probabilities [14] , [16] . Another approach is to use techniques developed for more general uncertainty measure, e.g., lower prevision [27] , capacity [19, 20] , which includes belief functions as a special class. We will discuss these works in more details in Section 6.
In this paper, we propose a decision theory assuming that uncertainty is represented by a pcb. The paper is structured as follows. The derivation of pcb by Walley is reviewed in the next section. In section 4, after a brief review of the vNM axioms that lead to expected utility (EU) representation of probabilistic lotteries as well as the axioms that lead to binary qualitative utility (QU) representation of possibilistic lotteries, we introduce an axiom system for pcb lotteries and prove a representation theorem. We present one example in section 5. Section 6 discusses related literature. The final section has some concluding remarks.
For convenience, we list an incomplete inventory of notations used in the paper: Θ is used for parameter space; U -space of decision outcomes; wan outcome; upper case letters at the beginning of alphabet A, B, C, E, F denote events or subsets of parameter space; upper case letters at the end X, Y, Z for variables; lower case letters x, y, z for their values; lower case letters f, g for acts which also are denoted as set with {, } boundaries; L for lottery which also use square bracket boundaries [, ] ; P, p for probability; Π, π for possibility; Pl for plausibility; m for mass function; L for lottery set; Greek lower letters λ, ρ for the left and right components of a two-component utility; set of such elements is denoted by Ψ; for preference relation; Lik for (normalized) likelihood; For the rest of this paper slash "/" does not denote arithmetic division, it is used to separate degree of uncertainty and associated outcome.
Partially Consonant Belief Functions
Walley [26] has derived pcb in the context of the statistical inference problem. The statistical inference problem is described by a triplet of sets (X , Θ, P) where X is the sample space, Θ is the parameter space and P is the set of uncertainty measures on X indexed by parameter values in Θ. A statistical evidence/observation/data is a value x ∈ X . The prior knowledge about parameters may or may not exist. The objective is to make inference about the unobserved parameter θ ∈ Θ of the data generating process.
The Bayesian theory assumes that (1) P = {P θ |θ ∈ Θ} is the set of probability functions on X parameterized by elements of Θ; and (2) prior knowledge exists and is represented by a probability function on Θ. The observational evidence and prior knowledge are then combined by Bayes rule.
The likelihood principle (LP) of statistics states that information contained in an observation x is adequately captured by the likelihood function derived from it. The likelihood of a parameter θ given an observation x is the probability of observing x if θ is the true parameter i.e., lik x (θ) = P θ (x). Moreover, proportional likelihood functions are equivalent (see, for example, [1] for a detailed discussion).
Dempster [3] , and later Shafer [21, 22] , arguing that prior knowledge and models can not always be adequately represented by probability, suggest a more general representation using belief functions. For the sake of selfcontainedness we repeat basic definitions and well known facts about DS theory. A basic probability assignment (bpa) or probability mass is a function
such that m(∅) = 0 and A⊆Θ m(A) = 1. The value m(A) can be interpreted as the probability that a world in A will be the true world. A set with positive mass is called focus. From a mass function, a number of other functions can be defined
Bel is referred to as a belief function, Pl as a plausibility function and Q as a commonality function. It should be noted m, Bel, Pl, Q are different forms of the same belief function since starting from any of them, the other three can be completely recovered using Möbius transforms [21] .
Belief function theory provides well-defined framework to discuss the notion of ambiguity.
Definition 1.
An event A is said to be ambiguous if there exists a focus that intersects with both a A and its complementĀ.
An ambiguous event A is characterized by a strict inequality Pl(A)+Pl(Ā) > 1 (equivalently Bel(A) + Bel(Ā) < 1). This is the case because (i) there exists a focus B whose strictly positive mass m(B) is counted twice in both Pl(A) and Pl(Ā) and (ii) the mass of any other focus is counted at least in either Pl(A) or Pl(Ā). Conversely, an unambiguous event is characterized by equation Pl(A) + Pl(Ā) = 1. If A is (un)ambiguous then so isĀ. Intuitively, an unambiguous event and its complement separates the set of foci into two non-overlapping groups and the plausibility of an unambiguous event can be interpreted as probability.
The combination of independent belief functions is done via Dempster's rule. Suppose m 1 , m 2 are two belief functions, their combination is another belief function denoted by (m 1 ⊕ m 2 ) defined as follows:
where k is a normalization constant. Since (1 − k) can be viewed as the mass assigned to the empty set, it can be interpreted as the extent of inconsistency between m 1 and m 2 .
In the special case when m 2 represents the observation B (m 2 (B) = 1), m 1 ⊕ m 2 is called the conditional of m 1 given B (m 1 (·|B)). In terms of Pl, a conditional belief function assumes a familiar form
In the statistical inference method argued by Shafer [22] , prior knowledge, models and observation are represented in terms of belief functions. The inference is carried by combining these belief functions using Dempster's rule.
Since prior probability and conditional probabilities in Bayesian model are also belief functions, Walley asks under which conditions their combination by Dempster rule is consistent with Bayes rule. He chooses to work with commonality form for convenience. Specifically, Walley studies functional Q that translates likelihood function which summarizes the Bayesian model (X, Θ, P ) and an observation x into a commonality function Q, and functional R that translates prior probability into a commonality function R. There are a number of desirable properties that Q, R (two-place mappings) should satisfy. Some technical assumptions are made. Θ is finite |Θ| = N. S is the set of likelihood vectors, P is the set of prior probability vectors. In the axioms listed below (according to Walley's original order), τ, σ stand for arbitrary likelihood vectors in S, ρ for any prior probability in P. Their components are denoted by subscripts. I B is the characteristic function of subset B ⊆ Θ.
Q(A, τ I B ) = 0 otherwise.
A1 and A3 require that any observational evidence (likelihood function) and prior probability can be converted into belief function form. A2 requires that two views on multiple independent observations as a compound evidence and as the combination of individual evidence are equivalent. A4 requires that belief function treatment is consistent with Bayesian treatment when applicable. A7 and A8 force Q under Dempster's rule to be consistent with the LP. A9 imposes consistency with Bayesian conditioning. Walley has the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Walley 1987 [26] 
Q(∅, τ ) = 1 and Q(A, τ ) = 0 otherwise (9) where k(τ ) = (
It is an interesting result. It says that to be consistent with the likelihood principle and Bayesian updating when applicable, belief function representation must have a special form. It should be mentioned that λ in (8) can be interpreted as the scale parameter and can be used to manipulate the weight of evidence, if necessary. For convenience, we ignore the discounting evidence issue and assume hereafter that λ = 1.
Our attention is on belief functions that are obtained from statistical evidence i.e., the belief functions obtained from application of functional Q on likelihood vectors. The reason we ignore belief functions produced by the functional R is two fold. From a practical point of view, the prior is not always available. From a conceptual point of view, if the prior is available then, by Bayes theorem, (posterior) probability can be computed, therefore, Bayesian decision theory is applicable. In this case, a decision theory for belief functions becomes unnecessary.
It can be seen that (8, 9) of Theorem 1 imply a special arrangement of the foci of a belief function. First, (8) and (9) jointly say that the commonality of a set can be positive if and only if it is a subset of one of A 1 , A 2 , . . . A s that form a partition of Θ. In terms of foci, because the commonality of a focus is positive, therefore it must be a subset of some A i . Second, for any pair of foci B 1 , B 2 that are subsets of A i , one focus must be a subset of the other in order to satisfy (8) . Let us consider the commonality values Q(B 1 , τ ), Q(B 2 , τ ) and Q(B 1 ∪ B 2 , τ ). By (8) 
Since (i) any focus that is superset of B 1 ∪ B 2 is also a superset of B 1 and (ii) focus B 1 is superset of itself but is not a superset of B 1 ∪ B 2 , the sum of masses of foci that go into Q(B 1 , τ ) is strictly larger than the sum of masses that go into Q(B 1 ∪ B 2 , τ ) i.e., Q(B 1 , τ ) > Q(B 1 ∪ B 2 , τ ). This contradicts condition Q(B 1 , τ ) = Q(B 1 ∪ B 2 , τ ). A belief function that satisfies (8) and (9) is called a partially consonant belief function. Walley's equations (8) and (9) characterize pcb in terms of commonality function. In the subsequent exposition, the mass and plausibility forms of belief functions are used instead of the commonality form. For reference convenience, we reformulate the definition of pcb in terms of mass function. The pcb concept includes as a special case the concept of consonant belief function considered in [21] in which foci are nested, one inside another. For a consonant belief function, its plausibility form Pl satisfies max-decomposition property Pl(A ∪ B) = max(Pl(A), Pl(B)) for A, B ⊆ Θ. This property together with a normalization condition Pl(Θ) = 1 ensure that the plausibility form of a consonant belief function satisfies characterizing axioms of the possibility measure which has origin in fuzzy set theory [29] and has been extensively studied by Dubois and Prade and others (see for example [5] ). In this paper, however, we use the term possibility function according to the following definition. Note that the conditioning notion derived by Dempster's rule applied for consonant belief functions corresponds to the notion of quantitative conditioning often described in possibility theory literature [5] .
Because the satisfaction of Dempster's rule requires evidence presented as probability (s = N ), Walley suggests that Dempster's rule cannot be used to combine independent observations. However, all the axioms above (including A2) are satisfied if Dempster's rule is replaced by another rule (⊗) defined as follows.
where k is a constant selected so that Q 12 is a commonality function. The significance of Walley's result is that (1) it points out the incompatibility between Dempster's rule and the likelihood principle in general 2 , and (2) it isolates a subclass of belief functions representing likelihood information that is consistent with the likelihood principle and Bayesian inference (applicable when prior is available). The pcb class includes probability functions and possibility functions as special cases (s = N and s = 1 respectively). In the intermediate case 1 < s < N , pcb has a remarkable interpretation: it can be viewed as a model for several possibilistic variables conditioned on a probabilistic variable.
Given the importance of this result, it is somewhat puzzling that pcb has not received the attention it deserves. This situation could be explained by the fact that Walley himself seems to dismiss pcb usefulness on the ground that the sure-loss or "Dutch book" argument can still be made against the use of pcb in decision making. To reach this conclusion, Walley assumes that functions Bel and Pl of a pcb are interpreted as lower and upper betting rates. In the subsequent sections, we develop a decision theory with pcb which voids this Dutch book argument. Specifically, we argue that Walley's interpretation of plausibility as a upper betting rate is not justified for DS functions that come from statistical evidence. The difference between our treatment of belief functions and Walley's betting rate mirrors the difference between the notions of statistical likelihood and probability. It is obvious that given prior probability, statistical likelihood and probability are functionally dependent via Bayes formula. However, in the absence of prior, likelihood can not be treated as probability/betting rate.
Decomposition of partially consonant belief function
In this section, we assume a pcb in the form of a plausibility function. First we prove some useful properties of pcb.
is a partition of Θ. A pcb with foci A ij with structure In this definition, we make a simplifying assumption each element of Θ must be in at least one focus. 
Lemma 1. (a) The plausibility function of a pcb in definition 4 has the form
Proof: (a). Define K(A) = {A ij |A ij ∩ A = ∅} -the collection of foci that intersect with A. By definition
Since (12), (13) we have
Pl(A i ∩ A). Now consider Pl(A i ∩ A). Since the foci inside A i are nested, for each A there is an innermost focus A iℓ for some ℓ it intersects with. So Pl( 
This contradicts the supposition, therefore B ⊆ A i for some i. This completes the proof.
From part (c), it follows that A is the algebra of unambiguous events characterized by pcb i.e., restricted to A, Pl is a probability function. From part (d) it is clear that A i are maximally possibilistic.
Theorem 2. For the plausibility function Pl given in (11) and
Conversely, if a plausibility function Pl that satisfies (14) and (15) i.e., Pl(·) is a probability function on A and Pl(·|A i ) are possibility functions on A i then it is a pcb and satisfies (11) .
Proof: (⇒) Given the plausibility function in (11), we need to show that functions P and Π i defined by (14) and (15) are probability function on A and possibility functions on A i . Obviously, by (14) P (A) ≥ 0 for any A ∈ A and P (Θ) = 1. For P to be a probability, we only need to show that
Because A and A ′ are disjoint, each A i cannot belong to both of them. If
. Next, we need to show that Π i defined in (15) is a possibility function. It is enough to show that Π i (A i ) = 1 and
The condition B, B ′ ∈ A i means B, B ′ ⊆ A i , therefore by (11)
is a probability function (denoted by P ) on A and s conditionals Pl(·|A i ) are possibility functions (denoted by Π i ) on A i , we will show that Pl is a pcb and satisfies (11) .
We use two well known facts: (1) the foci of a probability function are singletons in its frame and (2) the foci of a possibility function are nested 3 . From the fact that ∪ s i=1 A i = Θ and the sum s i=1 Pl(A i ) = 1 we conclude that the foci of Pl are constrained within each A i . Because if there were a focus that intersected with at least two A i , A j then the mass of that focus would be counted twice in Pl(A i ) and Pl(A j ) then the sum would be strictly more than 1. Therefore, conditioning on A i does not change the foci within that set. It follows that the foci of conditional Π i are also the foci of original Pl. Thus, Pl is a pcb and by lemma 1 satisfies (11) .
Using variables to represent Θ, the decomposition looks even more appealing. One has a probabilistic variable X whose domain has size s i.e. x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x s . Conditional on each value x i one has a possibilistic variable Y i whose domain has size m i i.e., y i1 , y i2 , . . . y im i . Then each element θ of Θ is characterized by a pair of values (x i y ik ) of X and Y . For each i, partition
Usually, decomposition is not a information-preserving operation i.e., the original whole is not recoverable from the decomposed parts. However, the decomposition of a pcb into a probability function and s possibility functions is information-preserving. Example 1 Suppose there are two variables X, Y whose domains are {x 1 , x 2 } and {y 1 , y 2 , y 3 }. A pcb and its decomposition are given as follows. 
Utilities
In this section we study decision making when information about the uncertain states on which decision consequence depends is represented by a partially consonant belief function. The basic object of study is the preference relation over lotteries on the prize set that are induced by acts. Since the pcb includes both probability and possibility functions as special cases, it is natural to expect that the decision theory to be developed for pcb will is the same and (2) among strata, possibilities are ordered in descending manner. Given that stratification, the innermost focus is A i1 and its mass is the difference between its possibility and one of the next stratum i.e.,
) and so on.
subsume the theories for probabilistic and possibilistic uncertainty. We start by reviewing these special cases and then move to the general case.
Decision problem, acts and lotteries
A decision problem under uncertainty is a tuple (S, ∆, A, U) where S is assumed to be a finite set. ∆ is a uncertainty measure over algebra of subsets of S. We assume that ∆ is equipped with a conditionalization operator that for each event E ⊆ S maps ∆ into a new uncertainty measure ∆ E on the algebra of subsets of E. U is the set of prizes. For the sake of clarity, we make the following assumption about prizes.
Assumption 1. (1) U is identified to the real unit interval [0, 1] and (2) the value of prize is measured in the risk-adjusted utility unit.
This assumption allows us to ignore the scaling and risk attitude issues and focus on the ambiguity. In discussion, we show how risk attitude can be accounted in this framework. Thus, 1 is the best (most desirable) and 0 -the worst (least desirable) prizes in U.
A is the set of acts which is defined recursively. Each prize w ∈ U is an act (called constant act or act of depth 0) i.e. U = A 0 . A simple act is a mapping of the form d : S → A 0 . The semantics of acts is obtained through the gambling interpretation. Act d is a gamble that if s is the true state of nature then d(s) is the prize. The set of simple acts is denoted by A 1 . Clearly, A 0 ⊂ A 1 because a prize w can be identified mapping ∀s ∈ S, s → w. Another notation for an act is by a set of rules. A rule is denoted by a hook arrow ֒→ to differentiate from a mapping denoted by a straight arrow →. d = {E i ֒→ w i |i ∈ I} where I is an index set, {E i |i ∈ I} is a partition of S and E i = d −1 (w i ) -the event whose occurrence triggers prize w i . An act of depth k is defined as a set of rules {E i ֒→ d i |i ∈ I} where d i ∈ A k−1 -an act of depth no more than k − 1. It is a gamble that instead of a prize in U will deliver a ticket to play another gamble. The act set A is defined as A ∞ . Visually, an act is a rooted tree [4] . A rule E i ֒→ d i corresponds to an edge labeled with E i from the root to a node which is the root of the tree representing d i . The leaves of the tree are prizes in U. An edge in a rooted tree has a natural orientation which we use the convention to denote the direction away from the root. For example, the tree in figure 2 represents act {E 1 ֒→ {F 1 ֒→ w 1 , F 2 ֒→ w 2 }, E 2 ֒→ w 3 }. The reading of this example is that if E 1 occurs then the decision maker receives a gamble (if F 1 occurs then w 1 and if F 2 then w 2 ); if E 2 occurs then w 3 . Logically, it is equivalent to 3 rules: if E 1 and F 1 then w 1 ; if E 1 and F 2 then w 2 ; and if E 2 then w 3 i.e.
In general, for a given leaf w i , suppose the labels on the path from the root to the leaf are E
k . The operational semantics of the rules consisting the path reads: "if E j ֒→ w i . Repeating the argument for each leaf, we demonstrate the fact that every act is logically equivalent to a simple act (of depth 1). This is referred to as the principle of equivalence. The difference between an act of depth k and its equivalent version of depth 1 is in the order the information about the true state of nature is revealed.
Definition 6. Two acts f and g are equivalent if the final prizes they deliver are the same no matter which state obtains i.e. f (s) = g(s) for any s ∈ S.
Example 2 In the fig. 2 , S describes possible outcomes of a dice rolling i.e. natural numbers from 1 to 6. E 1 is "an odd number", E 2 is "an even number", F 1 is "greater than 4" and F 2 is "less than or equal to 4". For the gamble on the left, the outcome of rolling is revealed in two steps: the first is whether the number is odd or even, the second is about the magnitude. In the case of even number, the prize is w 3 = 0, in the case of odd number, the player gets a ticket to a gamble which resolved on the same dice roll, if the roll is higher than 4 then player gets w 1 = $1, if the number is 4 or less then the player gets w 2 = $0.5.
The gamble on the right has the rules: if the number is even then player gets w 3 = 0, if the number is 5 then w 1 = $1, if the number is 1 or 3 then player gets w 2 = $0.5. It is easy to verify that no matter what the outcome the dice rolling turns out, both gambles deliver the same prize and therefore they are equivalent. Note that this equivalence is established before the issue of uncertainty is considered. We insist that the equivalence will hold under any uncertainty measure.
In a rooted tree, each node is associated with (a) an event which is the conjunction of events on the path from the tree's root to the node and (b) a subtree that consists of the node itself and all the nodes down the stream. With introduction of uncertainty ∆, a rooted tree (act) gets uncertainty annotation. Each node N is associated with a conditional measure ∆ E N (.) or ∆(.|E N ) where E N is the conjunction of the events labeling the edges on the path from the root to the node. The rationale for this requirement is that a decision maker is moving along a tree as she learns events, at each node, she would update her belief based on information learned so far. In the example of the left tree in fig. 2 , after being told that the dice roll is an odd number (E 1 ) she would move from the root (0) to node 1. At this point, she would condition her belief on that fact.
Each edge labeled with F emanating from N is associated with ∆ E N (F ). For example in the left tree in fig. 2 , the root is associated with set S and uncertainty ∆. Node 1 is associated with event E 1 and conditional ∆ E 1 . The edge leading to 1 is associated with ∆(E 1 ), the edge from 1 to w 1 with ∆ E 1 (F 1 ) and so on.
Notice that the path leading to w 1 on the left tree of fig. 2 is associated with ∆(E 1 ) and ∆ E 1 (F 1 ) while on the right tree, associated with w 1 is ∆(E 1 &F 1 ). All the measures of uncertainty considered subsequently have "chain rule" property ∆(E 1 &F 1 ) = ∆(E 1 ).∆ E 1 (F 1 ). This is another argument for the principle of equivalence.
When uncertainty ∆ is a pcb, a node is called ambiguous (unambiguous) if the event associated with it is ambiguous (unambiguous).
Lottery is a concept closely related to acts. If in a tree representing an act, all the events labeling edges are removed leaving only their uncertainty labels then a lottery is obtained. For example, instead of E 1 to label the edge from the root to node 1 is ∆(E 1 ) and in place of F 1 is ∆ E 1 (F 1 ) and so on. In other words, in a lottery, the nature of events are abstracted away. It does not matter to the decision maker if E i is "dice rolling outcome" or "precipitation quantity at some location on earth" as long as the uncertainty measured by ∆ is the same. This assumption is justified by an assumption that uncertainty measure ∆ captures all information relevant to the decision problem. For example, act
. Note the notational difference: in a lottery square brackets '[', ']' are used instead of curly brackets for boundary, and slash '/' is used instead of ֒→.
Linear utility for probabilistic lottery
When ∆ is a probability function on S, the lotteries are called proba-
Von Neumann and Morgenstern's utility theory (the exposition by Luce and Raiffa [17] ) considers a preference relation 4 P on L P that is assumed to satisfy the following axioms.
P1 (Strong order on prizes)
Preference P on U is identical with ≥ ("greater than or equal to") relation on reals i.e., w 1 P w 2 iff w 1 ≥ w 2 . In particular, 1 ≻ P 0 and for all w ∈ U, 1 P w and w P 0. P2 (Reduction of compound lotteries) Any compound lottery is indifferent to a simple lottery with prizes in U. Moreover, the probability attached to each prize in the simple lottery is the sum of the probabilities of the paths leading to the prize in the compound lottery. P3 (Continuity) Each prize w ∈ U is indifferent to a canonical lottery involving just 1 and 0. P4 (Substitutability) In any lottery, each prize can be replaced by the canonical lottery that is indifferent to it.
Note that the formulation of P 1 is stronger than the corresponding version found in [17] in the sense that it makes the P restricted on U a strong rather than weak order. This formulation is the consequence of our assumption that U measures the risk-adjusted utility.
The first part of P 2 is justified by the principle of equivalence. The second part of P 2 says that if a lottery L (a rooted tree) has k paths from the root leading to prize w with path probabilities p i 1 ≤ i ≤ k then L is indifferent to a simple lottery L ′ that has probability associated with w: p w = k i=1 p i . This is a result of additivity of probability.
The concept of canonical lottery is used in P 3, P 4 and P 6. A lottery that has the form [a 1 /1, a 2 /0] where 1 is the best and 0 is the worst prize in U is called canonical. [24] ). P satisfies axioms P 1 − P 6 iff there exists a utility function u :
Theorem 3 (von Neumann & Morgenstern
From (24), u(w) = w for all w ∈ U. This is the case because the risk attitude has been assumed away and the utility scale is fixed to the unit interval.
Binary utility for possibilistic lottery
Following vNM approach, in [8, 11] PP1 (Strong order on prizes) Preference Π on U is identical with ≥ ("greater than or equal to") relation on reals i.e., w 1 Π w 2 iff w 1 ≥ w 2 . In particular, 1 ≻ Π 0 and for all w ∈ U, 1 Π w and w Π 0. PP2 (Reduction of compound lotteries) Any compound lottery is indifferent to a simple lottery with prizes in U. Moreover, the possibility of a prize in the simple lottery is the maximum of the possibilities of the paths leading to the prize in the compound lottery. PP3 (Continuity) Each prize w ∈ U is indifferent to a canonical possibilistic lottery involving just 1 and 0. PP4 (Substitutability) In any lottery, each prize can be replaced by the canonical lottery that is indifferent to it. PP5 (Transitivity) Π on L Π is transitive. 
PP6 (Monotonicity
This axiom system PP has the same structure as the vNM system P except for the replacement of probability by possibility which is not additive. In particular, PP 2 says that if lottery L has k paths from the root leading to prize w with possibilities
Definition 7 (Ordered set of two-component elements).
Let Ψ be the set of two-component (binary) elements such that each component of an element is a real number in the unit interval and the maximum of two components of an element is 1
An order ≫ together with two operations: component-wise maximization cmax and product are defined on Ψ as follows:
Two comments are in order. First, two components of an element can be conveniently thought of as the indices of goodness (left) and badness (right). The more the left index the better and the less the right index the better. The only thing unusual in this case is that the goodness and badness are not additively complementary (if they were a single number would be enough). Thus according to ≫ , 1, 0 is the top element while 0, 1 is the bottom element. Second, it is not necessary cmax( λ, ρ , λ
Given this notation, there is a representation theorem for possibilistic lottery. 
The difference between this theorem and one by vNM is that for possibilistic lotteries the binary utility scale Ψ and cmax are used instead of the real unit interval and summation. The relation between the binary utility and the scalar utility has a parallel in the relation between possibility and probability.
In possibility theory, uncertainty of an event is characterized by a pair of necessity and possibility while the probability of an event is a single number.
Interested readers are referred to [7] for a detailed discussion. An issue that needs clarification is the operational semantics of binary utility. In [10, 11] we propose a framework called the likelihood gamble. This is a betting framework but instead of using probability, a person uses statistical likelihood information to make her bets. The rules of the game are the following. R1 A parameter ǫ has two possible values {ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 }. Each parameter value corresponds to a probability distribution P ǫ i (·) on a sample space X . The gambler is told about this information. R2 A computer selects a value for the parameter and generates an observation according to the corresponding probability distribution. Suppose that the obtained observation is x. R3 The observation x, but not the value of the parameter, is disclosed to the gambler. R4 The gambler is offered the following contract:
If w is the price that the gambler is willing to pay for the contract then we say she is indifferent between w and possibilistic lottery [Lik
The reason that allows us to make the connection between gambler's choice and her indifference is the likelihood principle. Because likelihood function is sufficient statistic, without loss of information, in rule R3, instead of being told about the observation, she can be told about the likelihood function associated with it. And since proportional likelihood functions are equivalent, instead of a likelihood function, one can use its normalized version.
A discernible reader will notice both the similarity and the distinction between this likelihood gamble and the classic coin tossing gamble used to assess linear utility. The main difference is that in coin tossing gamble, the rewards depend on the states (head/tail) for which gambler knows probability while in the likelihood gamble she knows only the likelihood of undisclosed parameter value.
In this likelihood gamble approach, the possibility degree of an eventthe plausibility of a consonant belief function -is not treated as an upper betting rate (probability) as suggested by Walley [27] but as the (statistical) likelihood. Obviously, Walley's sure-loss argument against the use of pcb has no force with respect to likelihood gambles.
Another remark is that as it is the case with linear utility for probabilistic lotteries, the possibilistic utility function (eq. (30)) is determined by its values on U. The behavior of t on U reveals what we call attitude toward ambiguity. Let us denote by t U the restriction of t on U i.e. t U : U → Ψ defined as t U (w) → t(w). t U can be viewed as a pair of functions ℓ, r where ℓ : U → [0, 1] and r : U → [0, 1]. However, not all function pairs can be t U because of constraint max(ℓ(x), r(x)) = 1. In general there is no requirement for ℓ and r to be continuous. For example, the following is perfectly acceptable.
In this paper, for the sake of regularity, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. t, as a vector function, is continuous in both components
i.e., for component functions ℓ and r of t lim x→a ℓ(x) = ℓ(a) and lim x→a r(x) = r(a) for a ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 2. Under continuity assumption of t, t(U) = Ψ.
Proof: Suppose, on the contrary, there is λ, ρ such that there does not exist any w ∈ U = [0, 1] for which t(w) = λ, ρ . Consider two sets
Because the order ≫ on Ψ is complete which is directly derived from the definition, for any w ∈ U either w ∈ U 1 or w ∈ U 2 i.e. U 1 ∪ U 2 = U. Also U 1 ∩ U 2 = ∅ because if the intersection is not empty then it is equal to λ, ρ . It must be the case that sup U 1 = inf U 2 because otherwise a w 3 in between would belong to neither U 1 nor U 2 which contradicts
For sequences w 1i in U 1 with lim i→∞ w 1i = w * and w 2i in U 2 with lim i→∞ w 2i = w * , because of continuity assumption lim i→∞ ℓ(w 1i ) = lim i→∞ ℓ(w 2i ) = ℓ(w * ) = λ ′ . On the one hand, because w 1i ∈ U 1 , ℓ(w 1i ) ≤ λ so at the limit λ ′ ≤ λ. On the other hand, because w 2i ∈ U 2 , ℓ(w 2i ) ≥ λ and at the limit λ ′ ≥ λ. Thus, λ ′ = λ. Similarly it can be shown that ρ ′ = ρ. So w * is the point in U with t(w * ) = λ, ρ . This contradicts the supposition that there does not exist any w ∈ U = [0, 1] for which t(w) = λ, ρ and completes the proof.
Recall that U ⊂ L Π because w ∈ U can be identified with lottery
Technically, the inverse of t is undetermined. However, abusing the notation slightly we define a function.
Definition 8. Function t −1 : Ψ → U is defined by the condition
This implicit function is well defined. For any λ, ρ ∈ Ψ by lemma 2, there exists w ∈ U such that t(w) = λ, ρ and therefore by eq. (31) t −1 ( λ, ρ ) = w. Moreover w that satisfies t(w) = λ, ρ is unique because if, on the contrary, there were another w ′ = w such that t(w ′ ) = λ, ρ . By representation theorem, w ∼ Π w ′ . This would violate the strong order on prizes PP 1. While t −1 is defined to satisfy the cancellation t −1 (t(w)) = w. The cancellation tt −1 also holds. Suppose that λ, ρ = t(w) for some w ∈ U. Then t −1 ( λ, ρ ) = t −1 (t(w)) = w. Applying t on both sides we have:
We use the cancellations to derive the certainty equivalence of a possibilistic lottery. An application of t −1 on both sides of (30) yields
Applying t on both sides of (34) and using tt 
The first link is due to Theorem 4, the second is due to axiom PP 1. Setting w = t −1 ( λ, ρ ) and w ′ = t −1 ( λ ′ , ρ ′ ) and using tt −1 cancellation we have the lemma.
Utility representation of pcb lottery
Let us now turn to the situation described by a partially consonant belief function (∆ is a pcb and denoted by Pl). Specifically, Pl is a plausibility function over Θ. For example, [a 1 /w 1 , a 2 /w 2 , . . . , a k /w k ] denotes a pcb lottery where a i = Pl(d −1 (w i )) is the plausibility of an event whose occurrence triggers prize w i . Notice that while probabilistic and possibilistic lotteries have normalization conditions ( i a i = 1 and max i a i = 1), for a pcb lottery a necessary condition is i a i ≥ 1.
Denote by L the set of (pcb) lotteries. Since pcb class includes both probability and possibility functions, we have inclusions: L P ⊂ L and L Π ⊂ L. As before we are interested in a preference relation on L that is a weak order (complete and transitive). Because L P and L Π are subsets of L we can consider the restrictions of on L P and L Π denoted by P and Π respectively. We want P to satisfy vNM axioms P 1 through P 6 and Π satisfies axioms PP 1 through PP 6. Note that L P ∩ L Π is the set of constant lotteries. To see that suppose [a 1 /w 1 , a 2 /w 2 , . . . , a k /w k ] ∈ L P then the normalization condition is k i=1 a i = 1. At the same time [a 1 /w 1 , a 2 /w 2 , . . . , a k /w k ] ∈ L Π implies that max i a i = 1. Since a i ≥ 0 it follows that a i = 1 for some i and a j = 0 for i = j. Thus the [a 1 /w 1 , a 2 /w 2 , . . . , a k /w k ] is the same a w i . Naturally, because P and Π are restrictions of the same on L P and L Π , they must be identical on the intersection of L P and L Π which is U i.e. w P w ′ iff w Π w ′ iff w w ′ (by definition). Now we describe a list of axioms which amount to pulling together P 1 − P 6 and PP 1 − PP 6 for relation on L.
B1 (Strong order on prizes)
Preference on U is identical with ≥ ("greater than or equal to") relation on reals i.e., w 1 w 2 iff w 1 ≥ w 2 . B2 (Reduction of compound lotteries) Any compound probabilistic (possibilistic) lottery is indifferent to a simple probabilistic (possibilistic) lottery with prizes in U. The plausibilities on the simple probabilistic (possibilistic) are calculated according to belief function calculus. B3 (Continuity of prize) Each prize w ∈ U is indifferent to a canonical possibilistic lottery involving just 1 and 0. B4 (Substitutability) In any lottery, a probabilistic lottery on an unambiguous node can be replaced by another probabilistic lottery indifferent to it; a possibilistic lottery can be replaced by an indifferent possibilistic lottery. B5 (Transitivity) on L is transitive. B6 (Monotonicity) For possibilistic (probabilistic) canonical lotteries
B7 (Equivalence between two forms) Each canonical possibilistic lottery is
indifferent to a canonical probabilistic lottery.
B1, the same as P 1 or PP 1, is about the preference order on the set of prizes is the same as the numerical order. The statement of B2 is an aggregation of P 2 and PP 2. The second part of B2 takes advantage of the fact that the belief function calculus subsumes probabilistic and possibilistic calculi. Note that B2 does not say how a generic pcb compound lottery is converted to a simple one. The reason for this silence is that in general case, belief function theory does not have an operator that calculates the plausibility of the union of two events directly from the plausibilities of each events. Axiom B3 is identical to PP 3 which requires that each prize w ∈ U is indifferent to a canonical possibilistic lottery.
Axiom B4 implies both P 4 and PP 4. In a probabilistic lottery, every node is unambiguous, so the unambiguity qualification is not necessary. In the case of pcb lottery, this qualification becomes necessary because besides unambiguous nodes, there are ambiguous nodes for which the substitutability may not hold. Restriction of probabilistic lottery substitutability for unambiguous nodes only is similar to weakening of sure-thing principle considered in [16] .
Specifically, if (1) L contains probabilistic L 1 and the node associated with L 1 is unambiguous and (2) L 2 is a probabilistic lottery such that
B5 -transitivity of is identical to P 5 and PP 5. B6 is pulling together P 6 and PP 6 and ensures the completeness of which together with B5 makes a weak order. The rationale of B6 is summarized as "the more plausible the best the better" and "the less plausible the worst the better". This monotonicity requirement holds for both probabilistic and possibilistic comparisons in the sense that the numbers can be interpreted either as probability or possibility as long as both canonical lotteries are of the same type i.e. they are both possibilistic or probabilistic. B6 can not be used to compare a possibilistic lottery with a probabilistic lottery.
B7 requires that each canonical possibilistic lottery is indifferent to a canonical probabilistic lottery (a probability distribution on {0, 1}). The above argument for the equivalence between 1 and possibilistic lottery can be repeated to arrive at the equivalence 5 1 and probabilistic lottery [1/1, 0/0]. Since both possibilistic and probabilistic canonical lotteries span the whole range from 0 to 1, given any canonical possibilistic lottery, there exists a probabilistic canonical lottery equivalent to it.
B7 may seems harder to accept if one think of it as the requirement for a decision maker (DM) to be able to switch between the probability and possibility forms of uncertainty attached to the prizes in a canonical lottery. The difficulty, in our opinion, is cognitive rather than intrinsic. A person may be more comfortable thinking in terms of probability than possibility. This is reasonable because of the long history of probability concept and its prevalent exposure in everyday discourse. However this epistemic challenge in no way would void the validity of the assumption. Instead, it points to the need of finding a probability-possibility conversion that is easy to understand.
Our strategy to find utility representation for is to find representations for restricted on L Π and L P and then use constant lotteries which are intersection L Π ∩ L P to connect the preference. We have a lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose preference relation
on L satisfies B1 − B7 then its restriction on L P denoted by P satisfies P 1 − P 6 and the restriction on L Π denoted by Π satisfies PP 1 − PP 6.
Proof: Let us consider the case of P . Since U ⊂ L, for w, w ′ ∈ U, w P w ′ iff w w ′ . By B1, w w ′ iff w ≥ w ′ . So P satisfies P 1. B2 implies P 2. Suppose L is a compound lottery and L ′ is the equivalent lottery obtained from L by collapsing paths from the root to leaves. If (a) L is probabilistic i.e. the uncertainty on each node is described by a (conditional) probability function; (b) the plausibility on each collapsed edge of L ′ is obtained by multiplying the plausibilities on the path (belief function calculus) then L ′ is also a probabilistic i.e. the sum of plausibilities on its edges is 1. Since both L and
The latter is guaranteed by B2 so B2 implies P 2.
B3, B5 and B7 imply P 3. For each w ∈ U, by B3 there is a possibilistic canonical C Π such that w ∼ C Π . By B7 there is a probabilistic canonical C P such that C P ∼ C Π . By transitivity B5, w ∼ C P .
B4 implies P 4. Suppose w ∼ C P where C P is a probabilistic canonical lottery, L[w] is a probabilistic lottery containing leaf w and L[x/C P ] is the lottery obtained by substituting w by C P . Because constant lotteries are probabilistic and any node in a probabilistic lottery is unambiguous, by B4,
B5 implies P 5. Because on L is transitive and P is a restriction of on L P then P is also transitive. 
Theorem 5.
on L satisfies axioms B1 − B7 iff (a) and (b) and (c).
for a function t defined in Theorem 4 and
Before proving the theorem, we describe the intuition of the utility expression. First, note that the lottery in part (c) [
with p i are probabilities and L i are possibilistic lotteries must come from act of the form {A i ֒→ f A i |1 ≤ i ≤ s} where f A i is an act defined on A i -the maximal foci of pcb. This is an implication of lemma 1. On the one hand, in order for p i to be additive each conditioning event must be a union of some foci A i of the pcb. On the other hand, in order for L i to be possibilistic, the conditioning event must be a subset of some A i . To satisfy both conditions the conditioning event must be exact A i . Next, we note that unlike its special cases for probabilistic and possibilistic lotteries, for a general pcb lottery
) does not directly include a i . To compute utility of an arbitrary act (tree), its equivalent simple version is constructed by collapsing the paths leading to prizes. Then formula in eq. (35) is applied for the equivalent version in the form of (c) which is constructed by conditioning the simple act on maximal foci of the pcb.
Third, the key fact that allows a combination two utility representations is that a prize w ∈ U has a dual views as probabilistic and possibilistic lottery i.e., L P ∩ L Π = U. 
The right hand side is a probabilistic lottery. By lemma 4, P the restriction of on probabilistic lotteries satisfies axioms P 1 − P 6. By Theorem 3, P is represented by linear utility function
(a) Let us consider a pcb lottery L f = [a 1 /w 1 , a 2 /w 2 , . . . a k /w k ] that is induced by act f = {C 1 ֒→ w 1 , C 2 ֒→ w 2 , . . . C k ֒→ w k } with {C i } is a partition of Θ and pcb Pl has the focus structure:
Consider the following act: g = {A 10 ֒→ f, A 20 ֒→ f, . . . A s0 ֒→ f }. It is not difficult to show that f and g are equivalent acts. As functions from Θ to U no matter which θ ∈ Θ is the true parameter, the prize delivered by f and g are the same. Viewing g as a rooted tree, we note (Theorem 2) that restricted on the algebra formed from {A i0 |1 ≤ i ≤ s} Pl is additive and conditional plausibilities Pl(·|A i0 ) are possibility functions. So, the lottery induced by g has the form of part (b). Namely, denote p i = Pl(A i0 ) and
Due to the principle of equivalence L f ∼ L g and transitivity of it follows
For an arbitrary lottery in L, due to the principle of equivalence, one can find one-stage lottery that is indifferent to. Suppose u and u ′ are certainty equivalences of single-stage L and L ′ calculated by eq. (36) i.e. L ∼ u and
Suppose a preference relation u is defined by function u given by eq. (35) with continuous t and strictly increasing t −1 defined by eq. (31) 
. We show that u satisfies B 1 to B7. First, we verify the fact that pcb utility (35) subsumes both linear utility for probabilistic lottery and the binary utility for possibilistic utility. If pcb is a probability function, each element θ ∈ Θ is a focus and each L i is a constant lottery w i . Because t −1 (t(w i )) = w i , eq. (35) becomes
If pcb is a possibility function then s = 1 and p 1 = 1, eq. (35) reduces to
which is the binary utility for a possibilistic lottery wrapped by the strictly increasing t −1 . This observation allows us to use Theorems 3 and 4. B1 is satisfied by definition because u(w) = w for w ∈ U. B2. For a compound probabilistic (possibilistic) lottery L, because u(L) ∈ [0, 1] as an implication of the observation that u reduces to expected (binary) utility. By definition L ∼ u u(L).
B3. By the reverse clause of theorem 4, u satisfies PP 3 which is the same as B3.
B4. Suppose L contains probabilistic L 1 and the node associated with L 1 is an unambiguous node. L 2 is also a probabilistic lottery such that
Because the node in L associated with L 1 is ambiguous, by lemma 1, the event E of that node is a union of some A i . By definition of
is possibilistic, by lemma 1, the node associated with it is a subset of some A i . Consider the possibility lottery L ′ that is obtained from L by conditioning on A i . Since the node associated with 
Binary utility extraction and ambiguity attitude
In practical applications, an operational problem a decision maker (DM) must solve before she can use formula in (35) is how to determine function t. The solution is that it can be determined through the exercising likelihood gambles as described in section 4.3. This activity is analogous to the practice of extracting linear utility function from a DM with an exception that for likelihood gambles the DM should handle the likelihoods obtained from observation, not probability with relative frequency semantics.
As a practical choice, the likelihood gamble game can be repeated for a large enough number of points in Ψ and then the neighbor points are connected to get a whole utility curve.
There is an alternative in which less DM introspection is compensated by an assumption that utility function has a parametric form. Instead of estimating whole empirical utility curve, decision maker's behavioral data is used to estimate the behavioral parameter.
Let us re-examine the likelihood gamble. Suppose that DM is indifferent between value w and having (possibilistic) lottery [λ/1, ρ/0] where λ, ρ are normalized likelihoods for (gamble) parameter values θ 1 and θ 2 respectively. This indifference can also be analyzed from a Bayesian point of view which assumes DM has a prior probability, says γ w , on θ 1 . DM's posterior of θ i would be
Then expected utility principle tells us the indifference implies the following
The last equality is due to u(1) = 1 and u(0) = 0. Substituting (37) into (38), one can solve for γ w in terms of u, λ and ρ.
The computed quantity γ w is called the implicit prior at w. In principle the implicit prior can vary for different values of w, but we make an assumption that it is constant i.e., γ w = γ for all w. From a practical point of view, the constant-implicit-prior assumption reduces the estimation of (binary) utility curve to the estimation of a single number. Suppose that the likelihood gamble exercise is conducted for k observations x i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The corresponding computed implicit priors are γ i . One of the most convenient estimate suggested by the estimation theory is the average i.e.,
Given the parameter value γ the relationship between scalar value w and equivalent binary utility λ(w), ρ(w) is as follows (see (37))
It follows that
Taking into account max(λ(w), ρ(w)) = 1, one can solve for 0 < w < 1
Let us give an interpretation to γ. In particular, from (40), t −1 ( 1, 1 ) = γ. Recall that 1, 1 = t([1/1, 1/0]). In other words, 1, 1 is the binary utility associated with the fair likelihood gamble in which the likelihoods of getting 1 and 0 are equal. Using a symmetry argument, one can argue that the "fair" price or the certain equivalence for this gamble should be the middle point 0.5 between u(0) = 0 and u(1) = 1. In this case (γ = 0.5), we say DM is ambiguity neutral. If γ > 0.5, DM is paying a "premium" price to enjoy the ambiguity in fair gamble. In this case we say that DM is ambiguity seeking. 6 In the last case of γ < 0.5 which is reasonably expected to hold for plurality of decision makers, DM pays a "discount" price for the fair gamble because of ambiguity in it. We say DM is ambiguity averse. Thus, γ characterizes the ambiguity attitude of the decision maker.
This classification of ambiguity attitude mirrors the classification of attitudes toward risk (probabilistic uncertainty). Risk seeking behavior is characterized by the convexity of the utility curve; risk averse by concavity and risk neutral by linearity. The differentiating term "ambiguity" signals that it has to do with non-probabilistic uncertainty expressible by DS plausibility, Dice face 1 2 3 4 5 6 m({1})
.2 m({1, 2})
.1 m({3, 4})
.2 m ({3, 4, 5, 6}) . statistical likelihood, or fuzzy possibility. For more discussion on ambiguity attitude and its relation to risk attitude readers are referred to [10] . Before we move on to the next section, it is necessary to address an assumption made at the start of section 4 to ignore the DM's risk attitude via a convention to measure the prize w ∈ U in risk-adjusted utility. If we want to account for risk explicitly we can do so by introducing a function r : $ → U where $ is monetary domain. The expression of pcb utility (35) then becomes:
In this utility expression, risk attitude is handled by r, ambiguity attitude by t and uncertainty information by p and π. They are all separate. Notice also that in case pcb is a probability function, because of cancellation t −1 t, decision maker's ambiguity attitude effect disappears as naturally expected.
Examples
Example 3 Consider acts described in fig. 2 . The situation is a dice roll with faces numbered from 1 to 6. The act on the right is f = {{2, 4, 6} ֒→ 0, {1, 3} ֒→ 0.5, {5} ֒→ 1}.
It is known that uncertainty is described by a pcb given in table 1. Example 4 We offer our treatment of Ellsberg's paradox [6] . Ellsberg discussed findings that a sizable proportion of respondents preferred IA to IB and, at the same time, preferred IIB to IIA. This observed preference is not consistent with the sure-thing principle because the pair (IIA, IIB) is different from the pair (IA, IB) only by the level of prize for white balls.
The uncertainty in the problem is nicely described by a pcb with 2 foci. m({red}) = . This pcb decomposes into P ({red}) = 1 3 and P ({yellow, white}) = 2 3 and Π(yellow|{yellow, white}) = Π(white|{yellow, white}) = 1.
We consider three cases of ambiguity attitude corresponding to ambiguity averse, neutral and seeking.
(1) Ambiguity averse attitude. We assume binary utility function t a ($1) = 1, 0 , t a ($0) = 0, 1 and t a ($.4) = 1, 1 . The first two equalities are natural since $1 is the best outcome and $0 is the worst outcome. The last equality implies that the implicit prior probability is .4 indicating somewhat ambiguity aversion.
In Figures 4 and 5 we show the calculation of mixed utility for the gambles. We have u a (IA) = .33, u a (IB) = .27, u a (IIA) = .60 and u a (IIB) = .67. This means IIB ≻ IIA ≻ IA ≻ IB. These preferences are consistent with the observed behavior.
(2) Ambiguity neutrality. We have t n ($1) = 1, 0 , t n ($0) = 0, 1 and t n ($.5) = 1, 1 and u n (IA) = 1 3 , u n (IB) = 1 3 , u n (IIA) = 2 3 , u n (IIB) = 
Related Works
This work touches two streams of research developed somewhat separately in economics and Artificial Intelligence communities. On the one hand, since the pioneering work of Ellsberg [6] decision making under ambiguity has been an active topic of discussion in economics. Two widely used models are Choquet expected utility (CEU) model by Schmeidler [20] using capacities and maximin expected utility with multiple priors by Gilboa and Schmeidler [12] . In recent years, the focus shifts to dynamic consistency issues [18] . On the other hand, DS belief function theory originated from statistics is actively studied by CS and AI community. DS theory offers expanded uncertainty expressiveness and at the same time provides well defined computational mechanism. It is not our intention to give a detailed review of what is going on in the fields. Rather, the aim is to provide contrast and similarity with our approach.
Smets [23] argues for a two-level process. At the credal level, an agent uses belief functions to represent and to reason with uncertainty. When there is a need to make a decision, the agent moves to another pignistic level in which the belief function is transformed to a probability function. The vNM expected utility is calculated with respect to this probability function. Specifically, in the pignistic transformation, the mass that assigned to a subset is divided equally to each element in the set. For example, the pignistic transformation of the pcb in Ellsberg's paradox is a probability function Θ red yellow white P Bet . 33 .33 .33
With respect to P Bet the utilities of the four lotteries are u(IA) = u(IB) = .33 and u(IIA) = u(IIB) = .66. This does not explain Ellsberg's paradox. Broadly speaking, DM attitude toward ambiguity (aversion/seeking) is not accounted for in this approach.
Although Smets argued otherwise, the pignistic probability function is obtained by invoking the principle of insufficient reasoning for non-singleton foci. However, this goes against the main motivation for belief functions.
It should be noted however, that this preference would be observed in our framework for ambiguity neutral DM.
Cobb and Shenoy [2] argue that the pignistic transformation is inconsistent with Dempster's rule of combination. They argue, instead, for the use of a plausibility transformation in which a probability function is obtained by normalization of plausibility values of singletons. For instance, the plausibility transformation for the same pcb Ellsberg's example is Θ red yellow white P P la . 20 .40 .40
With respect to P P la , the utilities of the four lotteries are u(IA) = .20, u(IB) = .40 and u(IIA) = .60, u(IIB) = .80 These utilities are not able to explain Ellsberg's paradox. Also, it suggests that IB ≻ IA, which is contrary to the observed empirical behavior. The plausibility transformation has a number of drawbacks. Notice that the probabilities assigned to singletons in the original pcb are modified downward after translation. The magnitude of distortion depends on (1) the total of masses assigned to non-singletons and (2) the sizes of non-singleton foci. However, it is possible to argue that the plausibility transformation is for the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions, in which it is inappropriate to interpret belief and plausibility functions as lower and upper bounds on some true but unknown probabilities since these semantics are inconsistent with Dempster's rule of combination.
Walley [27] studies a class of imprecise probabilities: lower prevision and, its dual, upper prevision. This class includes belief functions as a subclass. He argues that imprecise probability allows only a partial preference ordering among alternatives. The most one can make from such a partial order is to exclude all dominated alternatives. The set of remaining alternatives, which may be large, is left to decision maker to choose by calling in an additional choice mechanism e.g., randomization. This indeterminacy is a significant inconvenience to the decision maker. This approach, developed for imprecise probability in general, also fails to take into account the specific structure offered by pcb. In a disagreement with Walley's approach, our view is that statistical likelihood rather than betting rate semantics is appropriate for uncertainty expressed by belief functions.
Jaffray and Wakker [14] , [16] propose a decision model with belief function that combines linear utility with Hurwicz's α−criteria for decision under ignorance. For example, a belief function has foci {A 1 , A 2 , . . . A k }. An act f maps a focus into a subset of U i.e., f (A i ) ⊆ U. Jaffray argued that if the only information is "A i is true" then nothing is known about how likely a prize in f (A i ) is. Under this ignorance, an application of Hurwicz's criterion finds the certainty equivalence to be the linear combination of the worst in f (A i ) and the best in f (A i ):
Interpreting m(A i ) as the probability of focus A i , the utility of f is
In this approach, the ambiguity attitude is expressed by coefficient α with intuition that the more ambiguity averse the higher α, the weight attached to the worst outcome. For example at α = 0.6, the Ellsberg's gambles u J (IA) = 0.33, u J (IB) = 0.67 * (0.6 * 0 + 0.4 * 1) = 0.268, u J (IIA) = 0.33 + 0.67 * 0.4 = 0.598 and u J (IIB) = 0.67. These values explain Ellsberg's paradox nicely. Wakker [25] notes that "[Jaffray's] models, developed 20 years ago, achieve a tractability and a separation between risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes, and ambiguity beliefs that have not yet been obtained in other models popular today". However, a problem with Hurwicz's rule is that it can lead to dynamically inconsistent behavior [15] . Note that our approach possesses the desirable properties mentioned in Wakker's comments. A detailed comparison between Jaffray's approach and one presented in this paper is provided in a upcoming paper.
Schmeidler [20] , Sarin & Wakker [19] argue for the use of Choquet expected utility (CEU) for non-additive probability or capacity. A real value set function ν on Θ is a capacity if it satisfies normalization conditions (ν(∅) = 0, ν(Θ) = 1) and monotonicity (ν(A) ≤ ν(B) if A ⊂ B).
For simplicity, assume the prizes are ordered w 1 > w 2 > . . . > w k with conventions w k+1 = 0 and E 0 = ∅. For a decision d with d −1 (w i ) = E i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, CEU wrt capacity ν is defined as
The CEU representation is obtained by relaxing a number of axioms that originally leads to vNM expected utility representation for probabilistic lotteries. The appeal of CEU is that it leads to an (complete) order of alternatives and is supported by intuitive (co-monotonic) axioms. However, in this model the ambiguity attitude is inseparably blent with the uncertainty (ambiguity) information. A capacity is said to be convex (concave) if ν(A ∪ B) + ν(A ∩ B) is greater than or equal to (less than or equal to) ν(A)+ν(B). Schmeidler [20] shows that a decision maker is ambiguity averse (seeking) iff the capacity is convex (concave). Why this inseparability is undesirable? Most useful uncertainty information come from objective sources: experiments, data, observations. For example, in medicine [13] the information obtained via randomized clinical trials is considered most useful, less useful is information obtained via systematic observational studies, the least useful is the kind of anecdotal observation. The subjective character of capacity measures does not facilitate information collection from the objective sources. For belief functions, there are many equivalent forms: bpa (m), belief (Bel), plausibility (Pl) and commonality (Q). These are equivalent in the sense of information i.e. knowing one form, one can calculate all other forms. If a belief function is obtained from statistical evidence then each of the forms embodies the same information. Among those equivalent forms, Bel and Pl are capacities. As capacities, however, Bel and Pl are opposite. Bel is convex while Pl is concave because Bel(A ∪ B) + Bel(A ∩ B) ≥ Bel(A) + Bel(B) and Pl(A ∪ B) + Pl(A ∩ B) ≤ Pl(A) + Pl(B). That makes CEU with Bel exhibits ambiguity aversion while CEU with Pl exhibits ambiguity seeking behavior.
For an illustration, let us calculate CEU wrt Bel and Pl for Ellsberg's gambles. For IA, E 1 = {red}, E 2 = {yellow, white} because red is associated with $1 prize and yellow, white with zero. Using (46), we find CEU Bel (IA) = CEU Pl (IA) = .33. For IB, E 1 = {yellow}, E 2 = {red, white}. We find CEU Bel (IB) = 0 and CEU Pl (IB) = .67. Therefore, CEU Bel ranks IA ≻ IB. However, CEU Pl ranks IB ≻ IA.
In our view, the fact that CEU ranking of lotteries depends on the choice of forms of uncertainty is problematic. Moreover, the lack of an explicit mechanism to express/measure ambiguity attitude is a deficiency. It is unclear how to express/extract ambiguity aversion degree for different decision makers e.g., a DM is more ambiguity averse than another.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we study decision making for a special class of belief functions called partially consonant belief functions (pcb) introduced by Walley [26] . Pcb is important because (1) it offers a meaningful generalization of both probability and possibility (those are special cases); (2) it is the only subclass of belief functions, which is consistent with the likelihood principle of statistics. Pcb has a nice interpretation -it can be decomposed into a probability function and a number of conditional possibility functions.
We use an axiomatic approach for the problem. A distinct feature of our approach is interpretation of plausibility as statistical likelihood, not as betting rates found in most other works on decision making with DS belief functions. Our axiomatics is similar to and inspired by von NeumannMorgenstern's linear utility theory [24] . We prove a representation theorem for a preference relation on pcb lotteries. Pcb utility is a mixed construct that subsumes both linear utility for probabilistic lottery and binary utility for possibilistic lottery as special cases.
Our approach is tractable and offers separate modelings of risk attitude, ambiguity attitude and uncertainty information. This separation is important in practice as it allows different factors that influence DM decision to be investigated independently from each other.
An obvious open question is if and how to extend this approach for the general case of DS belief functions. Our speculation is that it can but a clean closed-form expression as in (35) would be unlikely. The reasoning behind this speculation is that a neat expression for utility of an arbitrary belief function lottery could be used to easily compute plausibility/belief of an arbitrary event. Pcb class turns out to be useful enough while still has nice focus structure that enables a closed-form utility expression.
